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Abstract
This paper analyses some of the issues raised by Supreme Court application of civil liability
rules to traffic accidents in the years 1996, 1997, 1998 and 1999. Specifically, the aim is to
show and explain how Supreme Court case law is neither qualitatively nor quantitatively
representative when it comes to what, because of its real impact and society’s perception, is
the major area of accidental damages in Spanish society. The major theoretical positions are
described and those which actually have a weaker basis in theory are critiqued.
The second paper on this section of Tort Law for INDRET presents a model for applying
economic theory of accidents and insurance to the main problems arising from civil liability
insurance and how it is legally regulated.
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· Traffic accidents: the scale of the problem
In 1998 in Spain, there were 97,570 traffic accidents with casualties. These casualties took the form of
5,957 deaths, 34,664 seriously injured persons and 106,713 people with slight injuries [Ministerio del
Interior, Dirección General de Tráfico, Anuario Estadístico General (1998)].
The data broken down by type and place of accident can be seen in the table in Appendix 1.
In Spain, traffic accidents are the first cause of death through injuries and, at least for men, they are
among the first 10 causes of any type of death, if one takes all age groups into account. However, in the
5 to 25 age group car accidents are the principle cause of death for both sexes and the second for the 25
to 34 age group. Even in the 35 to 44 age group they are the second most common cause of death for
men and the third for women [Antoni PLASENCIA and Salvador MONCADA, "Accidentes”, Informe
SESPAS (1999)].
According to data compiled by MAPFRE, the insurance business spent over 330,000 million pesetas in
1998 on compensation for personal injuries and 470,000 million pesetas for damage to property. The
average cost to insurance firms of an accident with casualties was 1.2 million pesetas, but there are 300
cases that exceed the 100 million mark in costs (in other words, 1% of the victims took 8% of the
compensation).
The same sources estimate that the total direct cost of traffic accidents would mean a 60% increase in
costs born by the insurance firms. To gauge the total social cost one would have to add indirect costs
(costs of public accident reduction policies, the costs of administering justice, cost of the infrastructure
associated with motor vehicles).
In view of these figures, it is no surprise that when one pictures an accident resulting in injuries or
death, the first that comes to mind is a car accident. Neither is it a surprise that traffic accidents have
been the traditional area to which a rule of strict liability and the obligation of civil liability insurance
have been applied, and that they have been preferred to other scenarios as an illustration of the
economic model of bilateral accidents, formulated and streamlined by law and economics theorists for
the last twenty years.
· Cases reaching the Supreme Court: which ones and why
a) Cases of accidents reaching the Supreme Court
Considering the rate of traffic accidents, the number of Supreme Court rulings on the subject in the
period 1996-1998 is very low: just under thirty rulings in the First Chamber, around twenty in the Third
Chamber, and a negligible number in the Second.
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And yet, in qualitative terms, the cases settled by the Supreme Court are highly representative of the
main types of traffic accident, as categorized by the National Traffic Office: collisions, running over,
swerves off the road, and obstacles on the road.
However, the sample of Supreme Court decisions shows certain strong tendencies, in comparison with
the overall statistics on different types of accidents. A quick look at the ratios in the general accident
statistics and at the various Supreme Court rulings is enough to see that accidents caused by obstacles
in the road, of any kind, is clearly over-represented in Supreme Court case law and so, to a lesser
extent, are those of vehicles swerving off the road. On the other hand, collisions between moving
vehicles are notably under-represented in the Supreme Court’s verdicts on matters of traffic accidents.
Naturally, some of this bias can be easily explained by the intrinsic restrictions of some of the courts.
So, it is of no surprise that the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court only passes rulings on traffic
accidents caused by the presence of an obstacle or the poor conditions of the road surface: it is (almost)
only in these circumstances that one can imagine placing liability for the accident with a public
administrative body. In cases in which pedestrians have been run over or moving vehicles collide,
liability between private parties is brought into play, which lies outside administrative jurisdiction.
The trends in the First Chamber rulings are maybe more difficult to explain. As one might expect, civil
jurisdiction deals with a considerable number of collisions between moving vehicles – although not
enough to make up for the absence of this type of accident in the Third Chamber -, and, to a lesser
degree, with the running over of pedestrians. But neither is it so surprising that in the First Chamber
too, obstacles on the road make up a much lower percentage of the rulings than in the Third (which is
to be expected), but much higher than the general rate of this type of traffic accident. On the other
hand, the presence of claims against the employer of the injured driver is much higher in civil
jurisdiction, and so, therefore, is the number of industrial or farming vehicles involved.
Let’s see the percentages for each type of accident in the categories used by the National Traffic Office
(DGT).
Collisions between moving vehicles make up around 30% of all Supreme Court rulings on traffic
accidents. According to DGT statistics, though, 60% of accidents with casualties were due to a collision
between moving vehicles.
In terms of cases dealing with people being run over, the percentage of Supreme Court decisions
(approximately 10% of the total) roughly matches the general rate (with a slight tendency to under-
representation) according to DGT data showing that cases of people run over form 13% of total traffic
accidents with casualties.
With respect to accidents resulting from vehicles swerving off the road, these represent 26% of the
cases settled by the Supreme Court, compared to 20.7% of the total number of traffic accidents with
casualties.
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Finally, of the total number of Supreme Court rulings on traffic accidents, 33% related to any kind of
obstacles on the road surface. However, the general statistics on traffic accidents give a rate of only
3.6% of this type of accident with casualties, which undoubtedly constitutes the greatest imbalance
between Supreme Court activity and the real rate of a particular type of traffic accident.
Appendix 2 gives a complete list of the Supreme Court cases considered, with a brief description of the
facts and the ruling.
b) The Supreme Court’s limited control over traffic accident cases
Why is the Supreme Court not particularly representative in quantitative terms and why is there this
bias towards certain types of traffic accident cases as outlined above?
a) The main reason for the Supreme Court’s parsimony is a procedural issue: access to appeal is
strongly restricted for most of the compensation claims deriving from a traffic accident.
b) The relatively high number of Third Chamber rulings and, therefore, of cases of obstacles in the
road and, to a lesser extent, of vehicles coming off the road, and the low incident in court of what is
statistically the most common type of traffic accident (collision between moving vehicles) can
essentially be explained in the same way: these restrictions to access to appeal do not govern
administrative jurisdiction.
c) A high number of traffic accidents with casualties commence criminal proceedings. These criminal
proceedings do not end up in the Supreme Court, whether there is a guilty verdict or not. If there is
not, the Judge or Court, having heard the case, will give a ruling specifying the maximum sum of
money that can be claimed in compensation, within the limits of mandatory insurance cover (art.
10, Decreto 632/1968, of 21st March, which ratifies the amended text of Law 122/1962, of 24th
December, on Civil Liability and Motor Vehicle Insurance). This order is of an executive nature for
the purpose of articles 1435 ff of the “Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil” (Rules of Civil Law Procedure,
henceforth LEC) still in force (art. 15, Decreto 632/1968). Article 517.2.8th of the new LEC expressly
maintains these executive powers.
d) In the absence of criminal prosecution, or when the prosecution of civil actions within it have been
reserved, the civil trial will be governed by the oral proceedings, whatever the sum of
compensation claimed: “disposición adicional 1ª de la Ley Orgánica 3/1989, de 21 de junio, de
Actualización del Código Penal” (rule of procedure on Updating of the Penal Code). Even in those
cases in which, by mistake, the claim was heard in an ordinary declaratory trial, there is no
possibility to appeal, if the case should have been heard in oral proceedings: “Autos de Sala” (First
Chamber Court Orders) - 11.6.1996 (RAJ 7860), 25.2.1997 (RAJ 5113) and 15.7.1997 (RAJ 9146);
against these, STS, 1ª, 11.5.1998 (RAJ 3189).
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In fact, if court procedural rules had not been altered, the above-mentioned procedural restrictions
would have foreseen a noticeable reduction in the number of Supreme Court verdicts on the biggest
sector of accidental damages in Spanish society. The clear inclinations of the rulings of the three year
period we’re looking at would have just as likely have been accentuated: Third Chamber decisions
would have notionally continued to be confined to inadequate maintenance or signing of roads by the
relevant public administrative bodies. One can safely predict that for its part, the First Chamber, under
the current LEC regime, would still be restricted – “pace” the Fourth Chamber – to claims directed at
employers for traffic accidents suffered by their employees, as well as cases deriving from accidents
caused by obstacles in the road generating third-party liability (owner of animals, for example) or
vehicle faults (bringing us to manufacturer’s liability for defective products).
Collisions and running over of pedestrians together make up three quarters of all traffic accidents with
casualties, and it is probably not a good thing that they are completely deprived of Supreme Court
verdicts. However much one appreciates swiftness of proceedings, it doesn’t seem very sensible that
Tort Law, in what is quantitatively speaking the main accident sector, is almost totally entrusted to the
“Tribunales de Instancia” (the ordinary courts) and is practiced outside the criteria of the Supreme
Court. Maybe out of similar convictions to the previous procedural legislator, the new LEC can help to
reverse the process: from arts. 449.3, 466.1 and 477.2 LEC we can surmise that in hearings over damages
compensation deriving from traffic accidents, it is possible to file an appeal on the basis of one of the
two conditions provided for in numbers 2 (sum over 25 million pesetas) and 3 (“appeal”) of art. 477.2
LEC. This particular change in legal proceedings is at least a welcome one.
· The Supreme Court’s understanding of strict liability
a) The rules of law.
The Spanish law on civil liability and motor vehicle insurance (“Ley de Responsabilidad Civil y Seguro
en la Circulación de Vehículos a Motor”) clearly lays down a rule of strict liability, i.e., simple causing
of damage by a driver of a motor vehicle, for personal injuries caused to others (art. 1, paragraphs 1 and
2). In terms of damage to property, the cross-reference in art. 1, paragraph 3 to art. 1902 of the civil code
and art. 19 of the annulled penal code clearly cites the validity of the rule of negligence, that is, liability
for breach of duty of care, as well as causing damages.
Clearly, this distinction between personal and material damages when applying a rule of strict liability
or of negligence does not seem to have any theoretical basis that can be recognized and shared. It
doesn’t make much sense that damages resulting from a single event can be subject to different liability
rules, especially bearing in mind that, from the ex ante point of view of the driver’s conduct, in the vast
majority of cases, it’s impossible to separate situations in which either type of damages can be caused:
when the driver takes decisions pertinent to the risk of causing a traffic accident, he is completely
unaware, except in extreme cases, of whether he’s going to cause personal injury, damage to property,
or both (which is the most likely). But the consequences of this confusion, for the reasons given below,
are probably not as alarming as one might at first think.
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The law also includes a rule of burden of proof for circumstances exonerating the driver who causes
personal injuries from strict liability: if he wants to free himself of liability, the driver must prove the
sole negligence of the victim or a force majeure outside the act of driving or the functioning of the
vehicle.
It would be a risky business to make an assessment which tried to generalize legal preference for strict
liability in traffic accidents with casualties, even if the victim’s conduct is taken into account: sole guilt
and compensation for negligence. It is true that the main points in favor of strict liability (the inherently
dangerous nature of the activity, relevance of the levels of the causer’s activity to the risk of accident)
are present in accidents caused by motor vehicles. However, greater empirical knowledge is needed of
the actual weight of these variables in the real context of traffic in Spain, before one can reach a final
judgment.
b) The Supreme Court’s interpretation.
Supreme Court case law provides differing statements on its understanding and interpretation of the
legal rules referred to above, which are full of difficulties and uncertainties, if not patent confusion and
ambiguity. Below, we examine some of the more relevant stances taken by the Supreme Court on this
matter.
· The first refers to cases on collisions of moving vehicles. For the Supreme Court, although there
may be personal injuries, strict liability does not hold sway, negligence does; and, moreover,
whoever wants to claim damages will have to prove the negligence of the other party : STS, 1ª,
17.6.1996; 17.7.1996 and 6.3.1998.
Some lawyers have openly criticized this stance and seen in it an undesirable return to subjectivism
in traffic accident liability (see Manuel MEDINA CRESPO, Responsabilidad civil automovilística.
De las culpas absueltas a las inocencias condenadas, 110 (1996) and Juan F. GARNICA MARTÍN, “
Inversión de la carga de la prueba y enjuiciamiento de los daños recíprocos sin prueba de culpa en
la responsabilidad civil del automóvil: Crítica a una jurisprudencia equivocada”, La Ley “ (1999)).
But these criticisms reveal a chink of confusion between strict liability and reversal of the burden of
proof and overlook the fact that strict liability works well when the causer and the victim can be
distinguished and the activity of the causer is inherently dangerous. Otherwise (and this is what
happens in vehicle collisions, given that both drivers are simultaneously causers and victims and
both are carrying out a dangerous activity) it is more advisable to resort to rules that measure the
care taken by each party in the event, i.e., purely a negligence compensation rule. Moreover, in this
case, a rule of reciprocal strict liability for damages suffered by the other party would benefit the
owner of the largest, most expensive and occupant-filled cars, without any apparent justification.
It’s better to resort to negligence, and if this isn’t established, to first party insurance.
Resorting to strict liability, and through this, to civil liability insurance, without good reason in
terms of efficient prevention, means preferring a more expensive damage reparation system, such
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as third party insurance, to a mechanism that is cheaper for society and just as adept at
compensating (if not more so), such as accident insurance. On the greater cost of third party
insurance in relation to first party insurance, see: George PRIEST, “The Current Insurance Crisis
and Modern Tort Law”, 96 Yale Law Journal 1521 (1987) and Ralph WINTER, “The Liability
Insurance Market”, 5 Journal of Economic Perspectives 115 (1991).
· What is inexplicable – although maybe not as serious as it may seem for the efficiency of Tort Law
in the field of traffic accidents – is the peculiar jurisprudential interpretation of the relationship
between art. 1 of the Spanish law on civil liability and motor vehicle insurance (Ley de
Responsabilidad Civil y Seguro en la Circulación de Vehículos a Motor) and art. 1902 of the civil
code.
The Supreme Court disregards that this is a special regulation which, when applied, displaces the
negligence of art. 1902. According to First Chamber criteria, it is at most an additional factor with
some influence in the moderate but still appreciable process of making the rule of negligence more
objective, in virtue of hazard liability: SSTS, 1ª, 24.5.1996, 26.5.1997 and 12.12.1997.
This interpretation cannot by nature be shared. Formulating a rule of strict liability in the traffic
accident sector, in order to be able to do without thorough examination of the causer’s guilty or
negligent conduct, seems absolutely reasonable to me. In some way, the Supreme Court seems to
want to give negligence a higher statute than that of a simple liability rule that is just one of several
alternatives, and turn it into the inspiration behind all Tort Law (albeit admitting subtle
distinctions and moderations), or at least non-contractual civil liability. However, the negative
repercussions that this doctrine has are probably not major ones. And not only because of the
predominantly rhetorical tone with which the First Chamber of the Supreme Court affirms or
denies matters in the context of liability rules. The doctrine is not overly worrying because neither
is the clarity of the distinction between negligence and liability. This, at least, is the case for those
of us who believe that the division between the two is not sharp, either analytically or practically,
but that they share a common core, from which one can assess the overall cost and potential of
reducing the expected damages by way of the causer’s conduct.
· The mistaken understanding of this introduction of strict liability that can be glimpsed in some First
Chamber decisions, is a more serious matter (e.g., SSTS 16.9.1996 and 31.1.1997), when they
understand that one cannot apply a rule of strict or hazard liability but a rule of negligence in the
strictest sense, when the victim’s conduct fits into the category of sole negligence of the aggrieved
party (art. 1.2., Ley de Responsabilidad Civil y Seguro en la Circulación de Vehículos a Motor). The
dangerousness of driving and the applicable liability rule, then, would depend on the conduct of
the specific victim.
With this way of looking at it, the grounds of dangerousness for strict liability become totally
diluted (and here it really doesn’t make any difference if one sees it as a rule that is completely
separate from that of negligence or rather as a simple shift in the cost-benefit analysis). Strict
liability does offer certain advantages when regulating inherently dangerous activities, in other
words, those that, even when they are carried out with the socially desirable degree of precaution,
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“strictu sensu”, still have a noticeable degree of foreseeable danger (either through the high
probability of the danger, or its magnitude). This danger forms part of the activity per se and does
not depend on the fact that the person undertaking the dangerous activity (such as driving a motor
vehicle, which does seem inherently dangerous when compared to non-motorized forms of
transport) comes across one cautious victim and one incautious victim. An activity might be
described as dangerous, but the care taken by the particular victim is not and must not be a factor
when judging this danger. Moreover, given that the causer, when deciding his or her conduct (level
of activity and care) does not know if the potential victim will or will not be cautious and cannot
know beforehand if the rule of liability is to govern his or her activity. Another very different thing
is if the accident is of a type in which the victim’s conduct affects the risk of accident (bilateral
accident, in the terminology of economic analysis of law), this conduct should not be left out of the
rule of liability. If the victim is in no way “penalized” for not taking the necessary precautions to
reduce the risk of damage, a rule of strict liability induces lack of care in potential victims. This
means that strict liability can be corrected with rules of contributory negligence or comparative
negligence but does not mean that the applicable rule depends on if the victim was negligent or not.
· There is another no less serious area of confusion underlying some First Chamber rulings of the
Supreme Court on matters of traffic accidents: equating the process of objectifying liability with
reversing the burden of proof over the damage causer’s negligence in favor of the victim: SSTS, 1ª,
17.7.1996; 31.1.1997 y 12.12.1997. This identification is worthy of some criticism.
The rules of liability and the rules on burden of proof can, and to a large extent do, have
considerably different aims, both conceptually and, more importantly, practically.
The former essentially aim to minimize the social cost of accidents. This is understood as the sum
of damages deriving from accidents and the whole cost of implementing precautionary measures
to avoid them. The latter are mainly directed at minimizing the sum of the costs of presenting
evidence to successfully support ones own aims in the judicial proceedings, and the costs deriving
from a mistaken decision by the legal body. It is true, however, that the costs of judicial error in
Tort Law should encompass the costs to prevention incurred by the mistaken ruling. To sum up,
then, the social objectives of Tort Law do effect the aims of the burden of proof rules, albeit
partially and with a time lapse.
Despite this correlation, the specific factors that must come to bear on the choice of liability rule or
allocation of burden of proof, are quite distinct. A preference for strict liability in a certain sector of
tort law rests on factors such as the intrinsic dangerousness of the activity, the relevance of the
causer’s level of activity in the potential damage, the unilateral or bilateral nature of the accident
and, within this, the greater or lesser incidence of the victim’s level of activity. However, imposing
the burden of proof of negligence on the defendant rests on factors such as the lower cost, in
comparison to the plaintiff, of presenting evidence, the lesser importance of imposing liability on
the causer than the victim not receiving compensation, or the greater prior likelihood (in the
Bayesian sense) of the causer being negligent. In fact, if the factors supporting preference for
introducing strict liability in allocating burden of proof were to have any relevance, their weight
would tip the scales towards imposing burden of proof on the victim-plaintiff, and not on the
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causer-defendant, as I have pointed out in my work “Carga de la prueba y reglas de
responsabilidad”. But that’s another story.
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APPENDIX 1
GENERAL TOTAL
TYPE OF ACCIDENT ACC. WITH
CASUALTIES
CASUALTIES
TOTAL FATAL DEATHS SERIOUS SLIGHT
COLLISION OF MOVING VEHICLES
HEAD-ON 6.194 679 996 4.159 7.661
HEAD/SIDE-ON 25.695 716 1.078 8.219 30.402
SIDE-ON 8.074 148 208 2.055 8.754
RUNNING INTO THE BACK 13.736 209 305 3.219 16.738
MULTIPLE OR IN CONVOY 2.445 82 128 876 4.527
COLLISION VEHICLE-OBSTACLE IN ROAD
PARKED OR BROKEN DOWN VEHICLE 1.582 41 65 469 1.617
SAFETY BARRIER 604 25 32 212 587
LEVEL CROSSING BARRIER 14 1 1 5 18
OTHER OBJECT 836 33 40 252 893
RUNNING OVER PEDESTRIANS
PEDESTRIAN WALKING BICYCLE 104 10 12 40 61
PEDESTRIAN REPAIRING VEHICLE 68 15 20 29 43
SINGLE PEDESTRIAN OR IN GROUP 12.399 700 933 3.918 9.797
LIVESTOCK HERDER 14 2 2 6 9
RUNNING OVER ANIMALS
HERDED OR IN FLOCK 63 2 2 25 65
LOOSE ANIMALS 434 9 13 117 480
OVERTURNING IN ROAD 2.753 78 102 828 2.524
COMING OFF ROAD (LEFT) )
COLLISION WITH TREE OR POST 988 79 101 448 903
COLLISION WITH WALL OR BUILDING 1.024 82 107 460 994
COLLISION WITH DITCH OR KERB 1.184 57 75 526 1.184
OTHER TYPE OF COLLISION 1.360 138 177 635 1.385
WITH BREAK-UP OF VEHICLE 543 67 79 315 490
OVERTURNING 3.929 283 366 1.986 3.993
FLAT 379 6 8 104 420
OTHER TYPE OF EXIT 152 8 9 47 164
COMING OFF ROAD (RIGHT))
COLLISION WITH TREE OR POST 1.432 121 154 734 1.415
COLLISION WITH WALL OR BUILDING 1.100 96 123 555 1.072
COLLISION WITH DITCH OR KERB 1.750 94 120 773 1.724
OTHER TYPE OF COLLISION 1.713 126 164 790 1.671
WITH BREAK-UP OF VEHICLE 691 101 132 435 637
OVERTURNING 3.112 216 281 1.534 3.296
FLAT 596 13 18 189 595
OTHER TYPE OF EXIT 228 9 11 64 232
OTHER TYPES OF ACCIDENTS 2.374 73 95 640 2.362
T O T A L 97.570 4.319 5.957 34.664 106.713
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APPENDIX 2
 Grouping of cases
1) Collisions of moving vehicles:
- STS, 1ª, 17.6.1996 (RAJ 5070)
- STS, 1ª, 17.7.1996 (RAJ 5676). Collision between a motorcycle driven by the plaintiff with the lights off
and the car driven by the co-defendant. The claimant alleged that the motorcycle was stopped on the
verge when it was knocked down by the car, but these allegations could not be proven in the trial.
- STS, 1ª, 3.10.1996 (RAJ 7009). The motorcycle on which the plaintiff was riding as a passenger (top
competitive gymnast and national gymnastics trainer) collided with a car driven by the co-defendant
on a narrow and steep curve in a main road on the island of Tenerife. The plaintiff sustained injuries
that left her totally disabled for her two professional activities and 35% disabled for any other kind of
physical work.
- STS, 1ª, 12.5.1997 (RAJ 3837). At a crossing with traffic lights, a car in which the plaintiff was traveling,
collided with a bus owned by the Empresa Municipal de Transportes de Madrid. As a result of the
crash, the plaintiff had to undergo amputation of his right leg from mid-thigh level.
- STS, 1ª, 24.5.1997 (RAJ 4323). Pile-up on the A-7 freeway caused by a bank of fog: a semi-articulated
lorry drove into the back of a tanker which caught fire and thereby caused the death of its driver.
- STS, 1ª, 26.5.1997 (RAJ 4242). On a local road in the province of Granada, a car crossed over onto the
other side of the road and collided head-on with another which was driving in the opposite direction
in excess of the speed limit (60 km/h, in a 40 Km/h area). The widow and children of the deceased
driver of the first vehicle had their claim for compensation turned down due to the sole negligence of
the deceased.
- STS, 1ª, 6.3.1998 (RAJ 1496). Once more, sole negligence of the victim: when driving at excessive
speed, a car swerved into the opposite lane and crashed into a lorry. The driver died and the
passengers in the car were injured. The widow and children of the deceased had their claim dismissed
in the first instance and in the appeal.
- STS, 1ª, 10.3.1998 (RAJ 1283). Collision that set fire to the car in which a father and daughter were
traveling.
- STS, 1ª, 1.4.1998 (RAJ 1868). Sole negligence of the victim: collision with lorry driving on the other
side, caused by a reckless overtaking maneuver by the deceased driver.
- STS, 1ª, 11.5.1998 (RAJ 3189). Similar to the above: excess speed, swerve onto the wrong side of the
road, fatal collision with on-coming vehicle.
- STS, 1ª, 4.7.1998 (RAJ 5779). The driver of a vehicle lost control when going around a curve and
collided with a van. The injured van-driver claimed 20 million pesetas from the owner and insurer of
the car. He was awarded 413,400 pesetas.
- STS, 3ª, 28.10.1998 (RAJ 8420). The vehicle driven by the plaintiff’s son drove over the median of a
freeway, crossed into the other side and collided with another car. The court dismissed the claim for
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50 million pesetas in compensation from the Ministry of Transport and Public Works for defective
fitting and finish of the metal safety barrier in the median.
- STS, 3ª, 12.11.1998 (RAJ 9148). A traffic light failure on the Ronda de Estaciones road in La Coruña
caused a three vehicle pile-up. The city council was ordered to pay compensation for the injuries
sustained by one of the drivers, with deductions for what had already been received from the
insurance companies.
2) Running over pedestrians:
- STS, 1ª, 24.5.1996 (RAJ 4009). A trade union member, part of a striking picket in the transport sector,
crossed the road while fleeing from several police officers and was run over by a truck. The widow’s
claim was overruled in all instances with the observation that the damages were the sole fault of the
“unthinking, negligent and careless conduct of the pedestrian”.
- STS, 1ª, 16.9.1996 (RAJ 6563). Once again, sole negligence of the victim: a woman from Barcelona was
run over by a taxi while she was trying to cross the road in an area with restricted visibility, not
designed for pedestrians, and where she had also run out unexpectedly.
- STS, 1ª, 28.7.1997 (RAJ 5810). A five-year-old boy was run over and killed by a motorbike ridden by a
boy of twelve and his sister of eight. The parents of the deceased claimed for and obtained
compensation from the parents of the motorcyclist and the company insuring the motorcycle.
- STS, 1ª, 26.9.1997 (RAJ 6862). A young man aged 17 (later disabled at age 21 for reasons unspecified in
the ruling, but apparently not related to the consequences of the accident) was run over when crossing
the road at a point not marked as a pedestrian crossing.
3) Vehicle coming off the road:
- STS, 1ª, 19.9.1996 (RAJ 6719). A 24 year-old driver died when the Opel Corsa he was driving veered
off the road. Apparently, there were no other vehicles or people involved and the weather conditions
and visibility were good. A few months later, the Opel dealer in Denia informed the parents of the
deceased that General Motors had detected failures in the brake valves of the model driven by their
son. The claim against GM for 20 million pesetas was finally overruled by the Supreme Court.
- STS, 1ª, 12.11.1996 (RAJ 7955). An employee died when his car came off the road during a work trip at
the end of the normal working day and without following the rules of rest. The victim was ordered to
make this trip by the company he worked for. His widow sued for 20 million pesetas and obtained 5
million, in compensation for negligence.
- STS, 1ª, 18.3.1997 (RAJ 1720). An agricultural worker died when the tractor he was driving – above the
speed limit – fell into an irrigation ditch. The widow of the deceased sued the owners of the tractor for
20 million pesetas, and finally obtained three million: in spite of the obvious negligence of the victim
himself, the tractor had neither the cabin nor the chassis required by law.
- STS, 1ª, 3.5.1997 (RAJ 3668). The driver of an articulated tractor died when his vehicle fell into a water
reservoir. The widow sued the owner of the tractor for 50 million pesetas in compensation, which was
reduced to eight million.
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- STS, 3ª, 16.4.1996 (RAJ 3214). The parents of two youngsters who had fallen with their car into the
Viñao river sued the Gijón city council for 8 million pesetas a year, alleging inadequate road signing
and the fact that the road should have been closed to traffic in such adverse weather conditions. The
claim was overruled by the T.S.J. and the Supreme Court.
- STS, 3ª, 7.11.1996 (RAJ 7898). The car driven by the plaintiff’s son veered of the road at km. 6.4 of the
Nacional VI highway and crashed into a lamppost, killing the driver. The claim was overruled in all
instances on the understanding that there was no causal relationship between the damages and the
activity of the public administration.
- STS, 3ª, 25.11.1996 (RAJ 8074). A driver died when his car came off the road on a dangerous bend and
fell into the Sorravides river. The widow claimed 30 million pesetas from the town council of
Torrelavega. The T.S.J. of Cantabria awarded 4,500,000 pesetas after observing simultaneous fault and
the T.S. confirmed the ruling.
- STS, 3ª, 5.6.1997 (RAJ 5945). A 14-year-old boy became quadraplegic as a result of falling from his
bicycle into a ditch on the side of the road that had no safety barrier and was concealed by vegetation.
The Comunidad Foral de Navarra’s was considered liable in both instances.
- STS, 3ª, 29.10.1998 (RAJ 9519). The plaintiff alleged that his car had skidded and come off the road
because of the poor design and lack of maintenance along a highway in Asturias. The road was in fact
the property of “Ensidesa” and not of Asturias, so the claim was rejected in both instances.
- SCR, 3ª, 6.11.1998 (RAJ 9525). The claimant requested 31 million pesetas for damages deriving from an
accident in which the truck he was driving veered off the Nacional 634 road. He alleged that the
excessively slippery asphalt was the cause of the accident. The Audiencia Nacional awarded 6 million
pesetas after observing concurrent negligence and the T. S. confirmed the ruling.
- SCR, 3ª, 27.5.1999 (RAJ 5081). The plaintiff’s son died when his moped veered off the street in Palma
de Mallorca. The street had neither sidewalks nor protective barriers at the sides, but did have a very
tight bend and a steep step down at the side. It was proven that the driver was going above the speed
limit. Sole negligence of the victim.
4) Obstacles in the road:
- STS, 1ª, 27.2.1996 (RAJ 1266). The vehicle driven by a member of the Guardia Civil on highway duty
collided with horses that had suddenly turned into the road. The officer sustained serious injuries that
led to him being disabled. His wife claimed 21,398,000 pesetas in his name and obtained a sum very
close to this in all the instances.
- SCR, 1ª, 17.3.1998 (RAJ 1122). A young man who was driving his moped one January night in 1992
crashed into a pine tree that had fallen onto the country road because of the heavy rains of previous
days. The consequences of the accident were extremely serious: total quadraplegia due to spinal cord
injury at neck level. The victim sued various public bodies for 250 million pesetas and both the city
council of A Estrada and the Galician Government were eventually ordered by the Supreme Court to
pay 30 million plus a life-long annual pension of 5,475,000 pesetas.
- STS, 1ª, 5.5.1998 (RAJ 3070). A motorcyclist and his passenger who were driving along a freeway
sustained injuries when a dog “came out of nowhere” and crossed their path. The highway
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management company was ordered to pay 10 million pesetas for the injuries, consequences and
suffering.
- STS, 1ª, 21.11.1998 (RAJ 8751). Three horses broke out onto the highway, hitting the moped driven by
the plaintiff and causing him serious injury. The requested sum of 100 million pesetas was reduced to
73,311,837, to be paid by the owner of the animals, 5 million of which by his insurance company (the
amount covered by the policy) .
- SCR, 3ª, 2.12.1996 (RAJ 8754). A vehicle drove straight into a works zone at 70 km/h (that had gradual
speed limits of 60, 40 and 30 km/h). The excessive speed and the loose gravel on the road caused a
serious accident resulting in the death of one of the passengers. The T.S. ruled that the Huelva
provincial council were not liable for not installing a sign saying “works, loose gravel” because the
specific speed limits were sufficient warning.
- SCR, 3ª, 25.3.1997 (RAJ 2295). A moped driver suffered an accident caused by an unsigned hole in the
road.
- SCR, 3ª, 19.4.1997 (RAJ 3233). A motorcyclist was injured because of a 15-20cm layer of mud on the
road. The mud had accumulated due to the torrential rains that had loosened the earth on the slope at
the side of the road. In both instances, the Catalan regional government was sentenced to pay
compensation: the mud could have been taken away or at least properly signed.
- SCR, 3ª, 5.12.1997 (RAJ 8783). Fatal accident in a danger spot (there had been ten accidents in two
months). After the accident, “dangerous curves” signs and an anti-skid layer were fitted. Liability was
rejected on consideration that the road was in good condition.
- SCR, 3ª, 10.10.1998 (RAJ 8835). A eucalyptus planted beside the main road from Castelldefels to Sitges
toppled onto the road on a windy day and one of its branches hit the vehicle in which the plaintiffs
were traveling. They sustained injuries of varying degrees. Against the pleas of the Catalan Regional
Government, the TSJ of Catalonia and the Supreme Court rejected the consideration of the wind as a
force majeure and ordered the defendant to pay personal and material damages.
- STS, 3ª, 15.10.1998 (RAJ 8349). The plaintiff alleged that the traffic accident he suffered was due to the
incorrect position of a signpost in the road. The Aragón provincial council’s liability was not admitted
as the causal connection was not sufficiently demonstrated.
- SCR, 3ª, 24.10.1998 (RAJ 8847). A driver suffered an accident after his vehicle went through a deep
puddle (0.20m) in the road, that had been caused by a blockage in the gutter. The Galician Regional
Government was considered to be responsible in both instances.
- SCR, 3ª, 4.5.1999 (RAJ 4911). The plaintiffs’ son died when his motorbike collided with the rosebay
plants in the median which jutted out 70 cm from the kerb. The Audiencia Nacional awarded 5
million pesetas in compensation and this was confirmed by the Supreme Court: although there was
negligence on the part of the victim, the ministry of public works had breached its duty to maintain
the median in good conditions.
- STS, 3ª, 6.5.1999 (RAJ 4797). Medical lieutenant in the Navy suffered an accident when the coastal
road along which she was driving was flooded by a freak wave. The Audiencia Nacional and the
Supreme Court rejected the claim, observing that the victim had shown serious negligence in view of
the weather conditions.
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STS, 3ª, 13.5.1999 (RAJ 4807). The plaintiff’s wife died as a consequence of an accident caused by a
large hole in the road. The TSJ of Galicia awarded 2 million pesetas in compensation, which was
confirmed by the Supreme Court.
